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SILENCE AT A PRICE?
JUDICIAL QUESTIONNAIRES AND
THE INDEPENDENCE OF ALASKA’S
JUDICIARY
KELLY TAYLOR*
ABSTRACT
The Alaska judiciary is constitutionally designed to be relatively
independent of partisan interests: judges are selected through a merit-based
process in which they are evaluated based upon their competence and
qualifications. In the months before Alaska’s 2002 and 2008 judicial retention
elections, the anti-abortion organization Alaska Right to Life sent judges
questionnaires seeking to pin down their views on controversial legal and
political issues. This Note explores the use of partisan judicial questionnaires
in the context of Alaska’s merit-based system of judicial selection. In doing
so, it explores past partisan campaigns against Alaska judges and devotes
much attention to Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v.
Feldman. At issue in Feldman was whether provisions of the Alaska Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibited judges from answering Alaska Right to Life’s
2002 questionnaire and, if so, whether the provisions thereby violated judges’
First Amendment rights.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2002 and, again, in September 2008, Alaska judges
running for retention received questionnaire packets soliciting their
views on disputed legal and political issues. The questionnaires, sent by
Alaska Right to Life (AKRTL), sought the judges’ views on issues such
as abortion and euthanasia. As AKRTL explained, it planned to
publicize the judges’ responses to the questionnaire and, based on those
responses, issue recommendations as to whether each judge should be
retained.
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Of the sixteen judges who received the 2002 questionnaire, only
four responded and none answered any of the questions.1 Blaming the
Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct for the judges’ demurral, AKRTL filed
a lawsuit in 2004 challenging three of the Code’s provisions2—the
“pledges and promises clause,”3 the “commit clause,”4 and the “recusal
clause.”5 Basing its claims on Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,6 a
United States Supreme Court decision invalidating the “announce
clause” of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct on First Amendment
grounds, AKRTL argued that provisions of the Alaska Code likewise
violated judges’ First Amendment rights by forbidding judges to answer
the questions contained in its questionnaire.7 Because the Ninth Circuit
eventually dismissed AKRTL’s lawsuit on ripeness grounds,8 it is still an
open question whether the relevant provisions of the Alaska Code will
survive after White. AKRTL’s questionnaire and lawsuit also raise a
broader issue: when a state has designed its judicial selection system to
be as nonpartisan as possible, as Alaska has, how should it handle
interest groups’ efforts to politicize that system?
This Note explores the issue of judicial questionnaires in Alaska.
Part I discusses the culture of the Alaska judiciary. Part II describes past
attacks on Alaska judges and, against this background, tells the story of
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman. Part III focuses
on the White ruling, including lower courts’ interpretations of it, and
Part IV considers, in light of White, the constitutionality of Alaska’s
judicial speech restrictions. Recognizing that Alaska’s judicial speech
restrictions could be invalidated, Part V explores ways of maintaining
judicial independence and nonpartisanship in Alaska without those
restrictions.

1. The judges who responded explained why they declined to answer the
questions. See infra Part II.B.
2. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d
1080 (D. Alaska 2005), vacated, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007).
3. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2006) (prohibiting
judicial candidates from “mak[ing] pledges or promises of conduct in judicial
office other than to faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the office”).
4. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006) (prohibiting
judicial candidates from “mak[ing] statements that commit or appear to commit
the candidate to a particular view or decision with respect to cases, controversies
or issues that are likely to come before the court”).
5. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1) (2006) (requiring judges to
disqualify themselves from hearing cases where their impartiality could
reasonably be questioned).
6. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
7. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1081–82 (D. Alaska 2005).
8. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840,
852–53 (9th Cir. 2007).
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THE CULTURE OF ALASKA’S JUDICIARY

Although the Alaska Constitutional Convention briefly discussed
possible benefits of electing judges,9 delegates placed too great an
emphasis on judicial independence to adopt an election system of
judicial selection. As Judiciary Committee Chairman George
McLaughlin warned, the judiciary in an election system is “dictated and
controlled by a political machine.”10 Delegate Edward Davis, citing
experiences in Idaho, cautioned that an elected judge is retained or
dismissed “completely irrespective of qualifications.”11 Concerned with
minimizing the influence of politics on Alaska’s judiciary, the
Convention voted by an overwhelming majority to adopt a merit-based
system of judicial selection.12
A. Judicial Selection According to Merit
Pursuant to the Alaska Constitution, judicial selection has three
steps. First, the Alaska Judicial Council (“Council”)—comprised of three
non-attorneys appointed by the governor, three attorneys appointed by
the Alaska Bar Association, and the Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme
Court—evaluates judicial candidates and nominates at least two for each
vacancy.13 Second, the governor fills the judicial vacancy by appointing

9. Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes Concerning Judicial Selection
and Retention, 583–611, available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/General/akc
con.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
10. Id. McLaughlin went on to note that a judge must “secure funds and
sometimes excessive and exorbitant funds for the purposes of being elected . . .
[and] keep peering over his shoulder to find out whether [a judicial decision] is
popular or unpopular.” Id. at 584.
11. Id. at 598.
12. Id. at 610 (rejecting an amendment to strike section of proposed Alaska
Constitution that would provide for merit-based system of judicial selection).
Also known as the “Missouri Plan,” merit systems of judicial selection combine
elements of the election and appointment methods to balance judicial
accountability with judicial independence. Mark S. Cady & Jess R. Phelps,
Preserving the Delicate Balance Between Judicial Accountability and Independence:
Merit Selection in the Post-White World, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 343, 352
(2008). Proponents of judicial election often argue that elections alone ensure
judicial accountability, while proponents of judicial appointment argue that
insulating judges from the electorate promotes judicial independence. Peter D.
Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 13–14, 17 (1995).
13. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 7–8; see also Susie M. Dosik, Alaska’s Merit
Selection for Judges, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 305, 312–16 (2004).
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one of the Council’s nominees.14 Finally, Alaska judges stand for
retention at the first election held more than two or three years after
their initial appointments and, after that, at various intervals depending
on the court on which they sit.15
The Council’s judicial nomination process is intentionally
nonpartisan in its information gathering procedures and evaluative
criteria.16 The Council’s initial evaluation of each judicial applicant
includes background checks, public comment, an extensive interview of
each candidate, and surveys of the Alaska Bar Association.17 Other
nonpartisan considerations include the applicant’s pro bono and
community service; counsel questionnaires, which are completed by
attorneys involved in the applicant’s most recent cases that have gone to
trial; signed bar survey comments; and reference letters.18 The Council
does not consider an applicant’s political or religious beliefs.19

14. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5. For a discussion of one Alaska governor’s
unsuccessful attempt to avoid appointing one of the Council’s nominees, see
Dosik, supra note 13, at 323–24.
15. Elections are held every ten years for supreme court justices, every eight
years for court of appeals judges, and every six years for superior court judges.
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6 (setting forth retention election guidelines for
supreme court justices and superior court judges); ALASKA STAT. § 15.35.053
(2006) (setting forth retention election guidelines for court of appeals judges).
Alaska district court judges stand for retention at the first election held more
than two years after their initial appointments and, after that, every four years.
ALASKA STAT. § 15.35.100 (2006).
16. See Dosik, supra note 13, at 312–16. Entrusted to seek the “most qualified”
candidates, the Alaska Judicial Council “has never imposed any sort of litmus
test to vet a candidate’s political views and does not inquire into a candidate’s
views on controversial political subjects.” Id. at 315.
17. Selection Procedures, Alaska Judicial Council, available at http://www
.ajc.state.ak.us/Selection/procedur.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). In its survey
of Alaska Bar Association members, the Council asks Bar members to assign
judicial applicants ratings between 1.0 and 5.0 in each of five nonpartisan
criteria: professional competence, fairness, integrity, temperament, and suitable
experience. While high ratings do not guarantee the Council will nominate an
applicant, very few applicants with low Bar survey ratings are nominated.
Alaska Judicial Council, Selecting and Evaluating Alaska’s Judges, 1984-2007, at 27
(2008) (providing a detailed breakdown of Bar survey ratings of judicial
applicants, judicial nominees, and judicial appointees since 1984). In each of the
five criteria, judicial nominees receive bar survey scores that are an average of
0.2 to 0.4 higher than those of the general judicial applicant pool. Id. at 28. The
Council also surveys attorneys to provide demographical information so it can
consider how an applicant is perceived by various groups of attorneys (e.g. by
judges, men versus women, or prosecutors versus criminal defense attorneys)
and identify where groups of attorneys are voting as a bloc, which may indicate
motives other than merit. Id. at 25–26.
18. Id. at 29.
19. Id. at 30. The Council will, however, weigh “whether the applicant’s
personal beliefs indicate a substantial bias or conflict of interest that could
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Based on this information, the Council then evaluates each judicial
applicant’s qualifications—both on her own merits and relative to other
judicial applicants for the same position—using seven nonpartisan
criteria of professional competence: communication skills; integrity;
fairness; temperament; judgment including common sense; legal and life
experience; and demonstrated commitment to public service.20
Alaska’s retention elections are also designed to insulate judges
from most partisan politics.21 The judges’ political affiliations, if any, are
not publicized,22 and judges are usually not permitted to campaign.23
Alaska’s retention elections are also non-adversarial; a judge standing
for retention runs against no one and if not retained, his vacancy is filled
by a new merit-selection appointee.24 Rooted in the notion that judges’
professional competence and integrity are of paramount importance
(and are not correlated with their personal politics), this design
encourages voters to weigh judges’ qualifications rather than party
affiliation. Before each retention election, the Alaska Judicial Council
conducts an evaluation of each state judge standing for retention and
publicizes that evaluation, along with the Council’s recommendation for
retention or non-retention, at least sixty days before the election.25 Like
its
nominations,
the
Council’s
retention
evaluations
and
recommendations are based on nonpartisan criteria related to judges’
qualifications and competence.26
impede the proper functioning of the courts or show that the applicant would be
unable to apply the law impartially.” Id.
20. Selection Procedures, Alaska Judicial Council, supra note 17.
21. See Dosik, supra note 13, at 324–25. Dosik also notes that interest groups
have campaigned against judges but have never succeeded in “persuad[ing] the
electorate to vote any judges out of office.” Id. at 325; see also infra Part II.a.
22. ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.030 (2006) (setting out ballot preparation guidelines
in judicial retention elections).
23. Judges may, however, publicly answer attacks made against them or, if
the Council makes a recommendation for non-retention, publicly answer that
recommendation. See Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5C (2006); see also
Antonia Moras, A Look at Judicial Selection in Alaska, ALASKA JUSTICE FORUM, Fall
2004, at 8, available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/21/3fall2004/213 fall
04.pdf.
24. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.05.080 (2006).
25. ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.100–150 (2006).
26. Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature
and Supreme Court, at Appendix F-1 to F-2 (2007). As part of its evaluation of trial
court judges standing for retention, the Council surveys attorneys, peace and
probation officers, court employees, jurors, along with social workers, guardians
ad litem and volunteer children’s case workers, regarding the judges’
performance. All those surveyed evaluate the judges’ fairness, integrity,
diligence, and temperament. Lawyers, who evaluate both trial and appellate
court judges, also evaluate the judges’ legal ability. Alaska Judicial Council,
Selecting and Evaluating Alaska’s Judges, 1984-2007, at 33 (2008).
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Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct

The Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct (“Alaska Code”) establishes
the standards for ethical conduct of Alaska judges and, in so doing, aims
to maintain judicial integrity and independence.27 To this end, the
Alaska Code contains both a “pledges and promises clause” and a
“commit clause” restricting judicial candidates’ speech.28 Canon
5A(3)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Alaska Code state that judicial candidates
“shall not . . . make pledges or promises of conduct in judicial office
other than to faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the office”
or “make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate to a
particular view or decision with respect to cases, controversies or issues
that are likely to come before the court.”29 Additionally, the Alaska
Code’s “recusal” clause requires a judge to disqualify himself from a
proceeding “in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”30 All three clauses are patterned after the 1990 American
Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct.31
Judicial speech restrictions like these are an effort to reconcile two
democratic values—the impartial role of the judiciary and free political
speech.32 As supporters of such clauses assert, if judges were permitted
to promise specific rulings in cases likely to come before the court,
“litigants would have the formal opportunity to argue, but those
arguments would be for naught where the judge, if intent on keeping a
campaign pledge to rule the opposite way, gave them but token
consideration.”33 By promoting judicial impartiality, restrictions on
judicial candidate speech likewise promote due process.34
Opponents of such clauses argue that restrictions on judicial
candidate speech are restrictions on political speech.35 Restricting speech
in this way, they assert, prevents candidates from expressing their
views, prevents the electorate from fully informing itself of those views,
27. See Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 (2006) (“The provisions of
this Code are intended to preserve the integrity and the independence of the
judiciary. . . .”).
28. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) and (ii) (2006).
29. Id.
30. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E (2006).
31. See Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble (2006).
32. See David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265,
311–12, 318–24 (2008).
33. Brief for Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants [hereinafter Brennan Center Brief] at 23, Kan.
Judicial Watch v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2008).
34. Id. See also Pozen, supra note 32, at 319–21.
35. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial
Candidates Are Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 736–38 (2002).
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and ultimately prevents voters from making an informed choice at the
polls.36
The drafters of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct were aware of
the First Amendment implications of judicial candidate speech
restrictions. In the Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d), the Alaska Code
references Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,37 a Seventh Circuit
ruling invalidating an Illinois clause restricting judicial campaign
speech.38 Though the Alaska Code, as amended in 1998, did not contain
the clause invalidated in Buckley,39 drafters noted that even the pledges
and promises clause could, if “read too broadly,” violate the First
Amendment.40 The Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) thus concludes:
“The Code should be interpreted in a manner that does not infringe First
Amendment rights.”41

II. POLITICIZING JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS AND ALASKA
RIGHT TO LIFE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE V. FELDMAN
Despite the steps Alaska has taken to encourage nonpartisanship in
its retention elections, elections are still subject to political influence. As
one law professor argues, retention elections may be “the worst kind of
election[s] to conduct for judges who have been sitting for long enough
to acquire a record that can be mischaracterized on major league outfield
fences.”42 In addition to mischaracterizing a judge’s record, political
interest groups may encourage voters to retain or not retain a judge

36. See, e.g., id.
37. 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
38. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) (2006)
(referencing Buckley, 997 F.2d at 225). Holding that the clause was overbroad, the
Seventh Circuit said it “reach[ed] far beyond speech that could reasonably be
interpreted as committing the candidate in a way that would compromise his
impartiality should he be successful in the election.” Alaska Code of Judicial
Conduct, Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) (quoting Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228).
39. In Buckley, the Seventh Circuit invalidated the announce clause. 997 F.2d
at 228. Prior to its 1998 revisions, the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct also
contained an announce clause limiting judicial candidates’ speech. See Alaska
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7(B)(1)(c), rescinded by Supreme Court Order
1322 (1998). Added in 1973 and amended in 1974, Canon 7(B)(1)(c) prohibited a
judicial candidate from “announc[ing] his views on disputed legal or political
issues.” Id. When Alaska’s Code was revised in 1998, the “commit clause”
replaced the “announce clause.” Compare id., with Alaska Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d) (2006).
40. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) (2006).
41. Id.
42. Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 107–13, 114 (Summer 1998)
(noting how easy it is to harm a candidate with accusations of little substance).
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based on his or her decisions in a few select cases rather than viewing
the judge’s overall record for fairness and competence.
Alaska Right to Life (AKRTL) is a non-profit organization that has,
as one of its goals, making sure those in positions of authority within
Alaska, including judges, are friendly to its pro-life platform. To that
end, AKRTL sometimes cold calls sitting judges or judicial nominees to
solicit their opinions on issues like abortion and euthanasia.43 Another
way the organization solicits judges’ opinions is by sending judicial
candidates questionnaires in the months before retention elections are
held.44 From AKRTL’s perspective, judges—regardless of their records
for fairness and competence and their decisions in other cases—are
unqualified for office if they do not share its views on abortion.45
A. Previous Organized Attacks on Judges
In past decades, partisan individuals and interest groups have
targeted several highly competent Alaska judges for their decisions in
select cases. While those campaigns have thus far been unsuccessful in
persuading a majority of voters to remove the targeted judges,46 their
successes and failures illuminate just how powerful such campaigns
could be in the future.

43. Interview with Karen Lewis, Executive Director, Alaska Right to Life, by
phone (Sept. 9, 2008). One way that Lewis has solicited these opinions over the
phone is by asking questions such as when the judge believes life begins. Lewis
said she does not publicize responses judges give her over the phone or share
them with the governor but she does share them with the AKRTL Board of
Directors. Id.
44. AKRTL likely made the initial decision to send questionnaires to Alaska
judges following the 2002 National Right to Life convention. As Lewis
explained, that was probably where she first heard about the United States
Supreme Court’s opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and met
attorney James Bopp. Id.
45. As the executive director of AKRTL explained, “If a legislator or a judge
will not stand up and protect innocent human life in the womb, I do not trust
[him] on any other issue.” Interview with Karen Lewis, Executive Director,
Alaska Right to Life, by phone (Oct. 7, 2008).
46. See Dosik, supra note 13, at 325. Voters in Alaska have removed only four
judges since statehood. Three of those were recommended for non-retention—
two in 1982 and one in 2006—by the Council for performance-related reasons.
See Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature and
Supreme Court, at Appendix F-5 (2007). The fourth, the only jurist to be removed
for political reasons, was an exceptional case. A few years after statehood, in an
effort to limit the Alaska Supreme Court’s control over Alaska Bar Association
activities, the Bar successfully campaigned against retention of Justice H.O.
Arend. See Alaska Judicial Council, Fostering Judicial Excellence: A Profile of
Alaska’s Judicial Applicants and Judges 14 n.36 (1999).
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In 1980, Alaska Supreme Court Justice Warren Matthews was
targeted for being in the majority in several unpopular Supreme Court
decisions, including a decision regarding the Alaska Permanent Fund.47
Despite the Alaska Judicial Council’s recommendation that Justice
Matthews be retained,48 a last-minute ad campaign—sponsored by
Chuck Imig, himself a candidate for the Alaska House of
Representatives—almost cost Justice Matthews his seat on the court.49
He was ultimately retained by the slimmest margin of any judge
running for retention that year—53.5% “yes” votes.50
In 1988, Alaska Supreme Court Justice Jay Rabinowitz, who had
served on the supreme court bench since 1965,51 was also targeted for a
handful of unpopular decisions.52 As with the campaign against Justice
Matthews, the campaign against Justice Rabinowitz was launched less
than a month before his retention election.53 One of the primary
organizers of the campaign, Fritz Pettyjohn, was himself a political
official.54 In response, attorneys Eric Sanders and Jeffrey Feldman
registered a group called “Citizens to Retain Jay Rabinowitz” to counter
the attacks.55 They raised nearly $40,00056 and launched a print
campaign highlighting Justice Rabinowitz’s non-partisan characteristics
of honesty, integrity, fairness, and dedication, as well as his thirty years

47. See “Zobel Case” Advertisement, paid for by Chuck Imig, THE
ANCHORAGE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1980, at B-5 (on file with Alaska Judicial Council).
48. See Julie Anne Gold, Justice contemplates close call, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 6, 1980, at A-4. (on file with Alaska Judicial Council).
49. See “Zobel Case,” supra note 47; Gold, supra note 48.
50. Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature
and Supreme Court, at Appendix F-16 (2007). Four judges standing for retention
that year were retained by 70% or more of voters, four were retained by 60% to
69% of voters, and five were retained by 50% to 59%. Id. at Appendix F-16 to F20.
51. See id. at Appendix E-3.
52. See “Jay B. Mallot” Advertisement, paid for by Alaskans Against
Retaining Rabinowitz, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 1988, at J-4.
53. See Associated Press, Groups for, against Rabinowitz ready to turn up heat,
THE ANCHORAGE TIMES, Oct. 30, 1988, at B-2. “Alaskans Against Retaining
Rabinowitz” registered with the Alaska Public Offices Commission on October
20, 1988. The retention election was held November 8, 1988. Id.
54. See id. Pettyjohn was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives.
Id.
55. Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, Partner, Feldman Orlansky & Sanders,
in Anchorage, Alaska (Aug. 21, 2008). See also Associated Press, Groups for,
against Rabinowitz ready to turn up heat, supra note 53.
56. See Sheila Toomey, Attorney files formal complaint over anti-Rabinowitz
donation, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 9, 1988, at C-2. So highly respected a
jurist was Justice Rabinowitz within the Alaska legal community, Feldman said,
“I’ve never raised so much money so fast.” Interview with Jeffrey Feldman,
supra note 55.
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of service to the Alaska legal community.57 In 1978, Justice Rabinowitz
had been retained with 67.8% “yes” votes; in 1988, despite his countercampaign, he was retained with only 59% “yes” votes.58
Finally, in 2000, abortion rights opponents targeted Alaska
Supreme Court Justice Dana Fabe and Superior Court Judge Sen Tan for
non-retention. In the years preceding the election, both judges issued
decisions in abortion cases.59 Beginning in August, AKRTL sent mailers
to its members and distributed flyers at the state fair asking voters to
vote against retaining Justice Fabe and Judge Tan.60 As the chair of
Alaskans for Judicial Reform, Fritz Pettyjohn again got involved in the
judicial retention process by sending notices recommending nonretention of Justice Fabe and Judges Tan and Peter Michalski, who
issued a decision in a same-sex marriage case.61 Justice Fabe and Judge
Tan both formed groups to support their retention, and their groups—
like the one formed on behalf of Justice Rabinowitz—highlighted the

57. See “Vote YES” Advertisement, paid for by Citizens to Retain Jay
Rabinowitz, THE ANCHORAGE TIMES, Nov. 7, 1988, at D-6; “Vote YES”
Advertisement, paid for by Citizens to Retain Jay Rabinowitz, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 1988, at D-7.
58. See Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the
Legislature and Supreme Court, at Appendix F-16 (2007).
59. As a superior court judge in 1997, Justice Fabe wrote an order holding a
hospital’s policy prohibiting abortions was unconstitutional under the privacy
clause of the Alaska Constitution. See Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coalition,
948 P.2d 963, 966 (Alaska 1997). The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the ruling.
See id. In 1998, Judge Tan granted summary judgment and enjoined on equal
protection grounds a law requiring most girls under 17 years old to obtain
permission from a parent or judge before consenting to an abortion. See Planned
Parenthood of Alaska v. State, No. 3AN-97-6014 CI, 1998 WL 35170806 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 1998). The Alaska Supreme Court reversed Judge Tan’s
summary judgment order, State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 32
(Alaska 2001), but later, in an opinion written by Justice Fabe, struck down the
same law as an unconstitutional violation of the privacy clause of the Alaska
Constitution, State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 579 (Alaska
2007).
60. See “Out of Control Judges” Mailing, paid for by Alaska Right to Life,
sent before 2000 retention election (on file with Alaska Judicial Council)
(recommending against retention of Justice Dana Fabe and Judge Sen Tan, as
well as Justices Warren Matthews and Alex Bryner and Judge Mary Greene);
Baby “Wants You to Help Stop Abortions” Flyer, distributed by Alaska Right to
Life (on file with Alaska Judicial Council) (recommending against retention of
Justice Dana Fabe and Judge Sen Tan).
61. See “Judicial Retention Ballot Notice” Mailing, paid for by Alaskans for
Judicial Reform, sent before 2000 retention election (on file with Alaska Judicial
Council). In 1998, before the marriage amendment to the Alaska Constitution
passed, Judge Michalski held that the Alaska Marriage Code violated the equal
protection clause of the Alaska Constitution by prohibiting same-sex marriage.
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *5–6
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
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jurists’ non-partisan characteristics.62 All three judges survived the
election: Justice Fabe with 57.1% “yes” votes, Judge Michalski with
56.9% “yes” votes, and Judge Tan with 54.4% “yes” votes.63 The average
percentage of “yes” votes for all other judges running for retention that
year was 65.1%.64
“If you can eliminate a Justice Rabinowitz or a Justice Fabe—both
among the highest ranked and most highly regarded judges the state
ever has had—no judge is safe,” Feldman said.65 If a partisan interest
group, angry over one or more of a judge’s decisions, targets him for
non-retention and successfully moves enough voters to vote “no” in a
future election, shockwaves would echo through Alaska’s judiciary. All
Alaska judges would know that they, too, could be targeted for a
politically unpopular decision. In this way, seeking to hold judges
politically accountable can threaten judicial independence.

62. See “Fairness” Advertisement, paid for by Alaskans for Justice Dana Fabe,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 3, 2000, at B-13; “Dedication” Advertisement, paid
for by Alaskans for Justice Dana Fabe, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 2000, at
A-6; “Integrity” Advertisement, paid for by Alaskans for Justice Dana Fabe,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2000, at A-4; “YES Judge Sen Tan”
Advertisement, paid for by Alaskans for Judge Sen Tan, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 2000 (quoting delegate to the Alaska Constitutional Convention
Seaborn Buckalew saying, “When we wrote the Alaska Constitution, we did our
best to keep politics out of the courts. . . . That’s why I fully support the retention
of Judge Sen Tan. He’s honest, fair, and makes decisions based on law, not
politics.”).
63. Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature
and Supreme Court, at Appendix F-16, F-18 (2007).
64. See id. at Appendix F-16 to F-20. In terms of measuring the impact of nonretention campaigns on retention votes, this average is, if anything, conservative;
it includes the percentage of “yes” votes Superior Court Judges Dale Curda and
Mary Greene received—56.3% and 51.9%, respectively—despite some
opposition to both judges’ retention. Id. at Appendix F-20.
65. Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, supra note 55.
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The Alaska Right to Life Judicial Questionnaire

In October 2002, sixteen66 state court judges standing for retention
in Alaska’s November election received a questionnaire from AKRTL.67
According to Karen Lewis, executive director of AKRTL, its members do
not have enough information about judges’ personal views on abortion
and related issues to make an informed decision at the polls.68 To obtain
that information, the AKRTL questionnaire solicited judges’ opinions on
several controversial legal and political issues, including abortion and
euthanasia.69 As a letter accompanying the questionnaire stated, AKRTL
planned to inform voters of the judges’ responses and “advise [its]
members to vote for non-retention” in the event a judge chose not to
respond.70
Following statements about controversial legal and political
issues,71 the questionnaire asked judicial candidates to check “Agree,”

66. According to election records, sixteen judges stood for retention in 2002.
See Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature and
Supreme Court, at Appendix F-16 to F-20 (2007); State of Alaska – General
Election November 5, 2002 – Official Results, http://www.elections.
alaska.gov/02genr/data/results.htm (Nov. 5, 2002). Both Alaska Right to Life
and the State of Alaska’s briefs agreed that all Alaska judges standing for
retention received the questionnaire. Brief of Appellants at 5, Alaska Right to
Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, Nos. 05-35902(L), 05-36027 (9th Cir.
Sept. 21, 2007); Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 5, Alaska Right to Life
Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, Nos. 05-35902(L), 05-36027 (9th Cir. Sept. 21,
2007); Interview with Karen Lewis, supra note 43. For these reasons, and despite
the fact that the State of Alaska’s brief and Ninth Circuit’s opinion state that
twelve Alaska judges received AKRTL’s questionnaire, this Note refers to
sixteen judges receiving the questionnaire.
67. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840,
843 (9th Cir. 2007).
68. Interview with Karen Lewis, Executive Director, Alaska Right to Life, by
phone (Nov. 11, 2008).
69. Id; see also Verified Complaint for Relief at Exhibit C-1 and Exhibit E-3 to
E-6 [hereinafter Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint]; Alaska
Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Alaska
2005). The questionnaire also addressed disposition of fertilized eggs following
in vitro fertilization and causes of action for wrongful life and wrongful birth.
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint at Exhibits E-5 to E-6.
70. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at
Exhibit C-1.
71. Issue statements were one paragraph in length and concluded with a
final sentence in bold print. Id. at Exhibits E-3 to E-6. The concluding statements
regarding abortion included: “I believe that the unborn child is biologically
human and alive and that the right to life of human beings should be respected
at every stage of their biological development,” as well as “I believe that Roe v.
Wade was wrongly decided,” and “I believe that there is no provision in our
current Alaska Constitution which is intended to protect a right to abortion.” Id.
at Exhibits E-3 to E-4. An issue statement regarding euthanasia read, in part, “I
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“Disagree,” “Undecided,” or “Decline.”72 Next to the “Decline” option,
an asterisk directed the questionnaire’s recipient to a statement at the
bottom of each page: “This response indicates that I believe in good faith
that, under a reasonable construction of applicable Canons of Judicial
Conduct or because my recusal would be subsequently required, I must
decline to respond to this particular question.”73 Within a few days of
receiving the questionnaire, several judges contacted Marla Greenstein,
executive director of the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct (the
“Commission”), the organization that reviews allegations of judicial
misconduct.74 She conferred with Jeffrey Feldman, then-chairman of the
Commission,75 and they decided that Greenstein would send a letter to
AKRTL expressing her personal concerns about the propriety of judges
answering the questionnaire and would copy Alaska judges on the letter
to provide them informal guidance. She would not, however, ask the
Commission to issue a formal advisory opinion.76 Sending this kind of
letter would accomplish two things: first, since it was not a formal
advisory opinion, it would preserve a ripeness argument for the legal
battle likely to ensue; second, and more importantly, it would protect
judges from having to respond by giving them public, albeit informal,
guidance.77
In her letter, Greenstein noted that Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White78 addressed a clause absent from the Alaska Code, that Alaska has
a different system than Minnesota of selecting its judges, and that other
provisions of the Alaska Code restrict judges’ freedom of expression.79
“It is my professional opinion,” Greenstein added, “that judges who
answer the questions in your questionnaire would be creating situations
believe that there is no provision of our current Alaska Constitution which is
intended to protect a right to assisted suicide.” Id. at Exhibit E-5.
72. Id. at Exhibits E-3 to E-6.
73. Id.
74. Interview with Marla Greenstein, Executive Director, Alaska
Commission on Judicial Conduct, in Anchorage, Alaska (Aug. 13, 2008). Judges
often contact Greenstein for informal guidance about the appropriate scope of
their speeches before groups. Id.
75. Id.; Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, supra note 55.
76. Id. Under the Commission’s rules, Feldman, as chair of the Commission,
had discretion to decide which matters would be handled informally and which
matters to place on the agenda for full Commission consideration. Alaska
Judicial Conduct Commission Rules, Rule 1(c)(1); Comment from Jeffrey
Feldman, Partner, Feldman Orlansky & Sanders, to Kelly Taylor, Editor-inChief, Alaska Law Review (Aug. 30, 2008).
77. Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, supra note 55 (detailing Feldman’s intent
to “give the judges cover”).
78. 536 U.S. 765 (2002); see discussion infra Part III.A.
79. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at
Exhibit D-1.

5 - TAYLOR__FINAL2.DOC

2008

12/5/2008 3:53:51 PM

JUDICIAL QUESTIONNAIRES

317

that would require them to be disqualified from sitting on cases
involving those issues.”80 Having received the letter, none of the judges
requested a formal advisory opinion.81
Of the sixteen judges who received the questionnaire, only four
responded and none expressed a view on any of the issues discussed.82
In lieu of answering the questions, the four judges who responded
offered explanations for their decisions not to provide answers.83 After
selecting “Decline”84 in response to most of the questions, Alaska
Supreme Court Justice Walter Carpeneti wrote, “I am not at all certain
that responding to your group’s questions is allowed under the Alaska
code and that it would not subject me to later recusal.”85 He then
directed AKRTL to three cases in which he participated that he said
“rais[ed] some of the issues covered in your questionnaire.”86 District
Court Judge Jane Kauvar also selected “Decline” in response to each
question and, in a blank space at the end of the questionnaire, she
simply wrote, “Based on advice from Judicial Conduct Commission in
my state.” 87 Superior Court Judge Charles Pengilly appeared interested
in answering the questionnaire88 but nonetheless selected “Decline” in
response to each question,89 explaining, “It appears that the appropriate
response to your questionnaire under the present circumstances is to
decline to answer.”90 District Court Judge Sigurd Murphy did not return
a completed questionnaire but sent a letter to AKRTL declining to

80. Id. at Exhibit D-1 to D-2.
81. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840,
847 (9th Cir. 2007).
82. Id. at 843.
83. Id.
84. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at
Exhibit E-1 to E-2. Justice Carpeneti amended the “Decline” statement at the
bottom of each page to say “recusal might be subsequently required” rather than
“recusal would be subsequently required” (emphasis added). Id. at Exhibit E-3 to
E-6. He left two questions about whether a constitutional right to abortion exists
at the federal and state levels blank. Id.
85. Id. at Exhibit E-1.
86. Id.
87. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at
Exhibit E-16 to E-19.
88. “Unhappily,” Judge Pengilly wrote, “White may have no impact at all on
the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct.” Id. at Exhibit E-10. He added, “I agree
with your basic premise: that if ‘judicial candidates’ in Alaska are free to discuss
these issues, the voters are entitled to know what their views are. I hesitate to
answer only because it is far from clear that judges in Alaska have that
freedom.” Id.
89. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at
Exhibit E-11 to E-14.
90. Id. at Exhibit E-10.
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answer the questions “for the reasons set forth in the October 16, 2002
letter addressed to you from the Alaska Commission on Judicial
Conduct” and included a copy of his personal “Judge’s Code.”91
Murphy’s response suggested that answering the questionnaire might
not only violate the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct but his personal
sense of judicial ethics as well.92
AKRTL did not send questionnaires to judges standing for
retention in Alaska’s November 2004 election.93
C.

Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman

Two years later, before the 2004 election, AKRTL and Michael
Miller, former president of the Alaska State Senate,94 filed suit in federal
court challenging portions of the Alaska Code as unconstitutionally
restricting judicial candidates’ speech rights.95 AKRTL and Miller
targeted the Code’s pledges and promises clause, commit clause, and
recusal clause.96 They named as defendants eight members of the
Commission, including Feldman, and six members of the Disciplinary
Board of the Alaska Bar Association.97 In August 2005, a federal district
court in Alaska upheld the Code’s recusal clause but held the pledges
and promises clause and commit clause unconstitutional.98

91. Id. at Exhibit E-7 to E-9.
92. As Judge Murphy stated:
Certain members of the public do not fully differentiate between the
personal convictions held by a judicial officer from that judicial officer’s
responsibility to uphold the law in his or her decisions, irrespective of
their personal view. Thus, if I were to emphatically express my view on
such topics as abortion, assisted suicide, and euthanasia, the same
would suggest to certain members of the public that I have pre-judged
those issues that may come before me as a judge and should require my
disqualification from sitting on cases involving those issues.
Id.
93. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840,
847 (9th Cir. 2007).
94. See Alaska State Legislature (former official website for House and
Senate Legislative Majorities) – Senator Mike Miller, http://www.akrepublicans
.org/pastlegs/Miller.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
95. Feldman, 504 F.3d at 843. Miller was party to the suit as an independent
voter who wanted to receive information from AKRTL regarding judges’
responses to its 2002 questionnaire. See Alaska Right to Life Political Action
Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at 6.
96. Feldman, 504 F.3d at 843.
97. Id.
98. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1082–84 (D. Alaska 2005) (holding that the pledges and promises and
commit clauses infringed the same speech challenged in White yet were
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In September 2007, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s
rulings and held that the case was not ripe for review.99 To survive a
ripeness inquiry, the plaintiffs required real threats of investigation from
the Commission and of disciplinary action by the Alaska Supreme
Court.100 First, the Ninth Circuit noted that no judge had requested, and
the Commission had not issued, a formal advisory opinion.101 The
decision by Greenstein and Feldman not to ask the Commission to
consider issuing an advisory opinion regarding the propriety of
responding to the questionnaire thus functioned in precisely the way
they had hoped.102 Second, the Ninth Circuit said it “lack[ed] any reason
to expect the Alaska Supreme Court to adopt and act upon a
[Commission] recommendation that ran afoul of the First Amendment,”
particularly since the Alaska Supreme Court had never interpreted the
challenged provisions.103 Finally, noting that neither plaintiff was subject
to the Alaska Code, the Ninth Circuit said the plaintiffs had not shown
they would suffer hardship without preenforcement review and called
AKRTL’s decision not to send questionnaires in 2004 a result of “futility
rather than First Amendment chill.” 104 The Ninth Circuit did not reach
the issue of standing.105

III. CHALLENGING JUDICIAL CANDIDATE SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
ON FIRST AMENDMENT GROUNDS
Alaska Right to Life (AKRTL) based its claims in Feldman on
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,106 a 2002 case that defines the
current standards for invalidating judicial candidate speech restrictions
under the First Amendment. Determining the constitutionality of
restrictions on judicial candidate speech requires reconciling two
competing principles: “Candidates for public office should be free to
express their views on all matters of interest to the electorate. Judges
should decide cases in accordance with law rather than with any express

unnecessary to ensuring judicial impartiality and granting plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment regarding the clauses).
99. Feldman, 504 F.3d at 852–53.
100. Id. at 849–51.
101. The Ninth Circuit held that Greenstein’s letter “at most constituted
informal guidance” and therefore had no legal effect. Id. at 849–50.
102. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
103. Feldman, 504 F.3d at 850 (citing commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) that
stated, “[t]he Code should be interpreted in a manner that does not infringe First
Amendment rights”).
104. Id. at 851.
105. Id. at 849.
106. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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or implied commitments that they may have made to their campaign
supporters or to others.”107 Although White was a narrow decision,
confined to invalidating a specific speech restriction called the
“announce clause,” the holding’s broad reasoning suggests that the
United States Supreme Court has reconciled these competing principles
to permit judicial candidate speech in all but the narrowest
circumstances.
A. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and the Constitutionality
of the “Announce Clause” in an Election System of Judicial
Selection
In White, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a provision
in the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting candidates for
elected judicial office from announcing their views on disputed legal
and political issues.108 According to the Court, this provision in
Minnesota’s code, known as an “announce clause,” violated candidates’
First Amendment rights.109
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of five justices, applied the test
of strict scrutiny.110 “[T]he announce clause,” he wrote, “both prohibits
speech on the basis of its content and burdens a category of speech that
is ‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms’—speech about the
qualifications of candidates for public office.”111 To survive strict
scrutiny, the clause needed to be (1) narrowly tailored to serve (2) a
compelling state interest.112
First, the Court considered interests the state alleged were served
by the announce clause: preserving the impartiality and appearance of
impartiality of the state judiciary. The word “impartiality,” Justice Scalia
wrote, can mean “lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding,” “lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular
legal view,” or open-mindedness.113 The Court seemed to suggest that
impartiality in the first sense, which ensures equal protection under law,
is a compelling state interest.114 Because the announce clause restricted

107. Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
108. White, 536 U.S. at 788.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 774. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate test; none of the parties involved disputed that conclusion. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 863
(8th Cir. 2001)).
112. Id. at 774–75.
113. Id. at 775–78 (emphasis in original).
114. Id. at 775–77.
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speech on certain issues rather than parties, however, it was not
narrowly tailored to serve a state interest within this first meaning of
impartiality.115 Ensuring a lack of bias for or against a legal view, the
Court concluded, is both impossible and undesirable;116 achieving
impartiality or the appearance of impartiality in the second sense,
therefore, cannot be a compelling state interest.117 Finally, skeptical that
Minnesota drafted the clause to guarantee judicial open-mindedness, the
Court called the announce clause “woefully underinclusive”118 if meant
to achieve that purpose and did not determine whether judicial openmindedness is a compelling state interest.119 Having concluded that the
announce clause did not survive strict scrutiny under any interpretation
of “impartiality,” the Court invalidated it.120
The justices in the majority were unsympathetic to the state’s use of
judicial speech codes to protect judicial independence within elected
judiciaries. As Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion, by
opting to select its judges through elections rather than appointments or
the merit system, Minnesota “has voluntarily taken on the risks to
judicial bias” inherent in election systems.121 While careful not to

115. Id. at 776–77.
116. Id. at 777–78. The Court quoted Justice Rehnquist:
Since most justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle
years, it would be unusual if they had not by that time formulated at
least some tentative notions that would influence them in their
interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their
interaction with one another. . . . Proof that a justice’s mind at the time
he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of
constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification,
not lack of bias.
Id. (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum opinion)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 780. After becoming a candidate but prior to his election, the
judicial candidate could not announce his views on disputed legal and political
issues; prior to declaring his candidacy and after being elected, however, a
judicial candidate was not prohibited from announcing such views. The Court
held the announce clause to be underinclusive for the purpose of ensuring
judicial open-mindedness because the proposition “that campaign statements
are uniquely destructive of open-mindedness” had not been established. Id. at
778–81.
119. Id. at 780.
120. Id. at 788.
121. Id. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Risks to judicial bias in selecting
judges through election include judges “likely . . . feel[ing] that they have at least
some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case” and, where
judicial candidates have had to fundraise to fund their campaigns, judges
“feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups.” Id. at 788–90. Even where
judges are able to stifle these feelings, the possibility that they would be unable
to do so risks undermining public confidence in the judiciary. Id. These are risks
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criticize election systems in principle,122 Justice Kennedy expressed a
similar view in his concurring opinion: “The State cannot opt for an
elected judiciary and then assert that its democracy, in order to work as
desired, compels the abridgment of speech.”123
In two dissenting opinions, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer asserted that judicial campaign speech does not warrant the same
level of protection of other political speech. Because different work is
required of judges and legislators—it being “the business of judges to be
indifferent to unpopularity”—judicial and legislative campaigns have
different speech requirements.124 As Justice Ginsburg wrote, “[T]he
rationale underlying unconstrained speech in elections for political
office—that representative government depends on the public’s ability
to choose agents who will act at its behest—does not carry over to
campaigns for the bench.”125 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent also articulated
ways in which the majority had misconstrued the breadth of the
announce clause126 and misunderstood its crucial role in Minnesota’s
judicial system.127

Minnesota accepted when it adopted a pure election system for judicial
selection, as opposed to an appointment or a merit-based system. Id. at 792.
122. Id. at 795–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“States are free to choose this
mechanism rather than, say, appointment and confirmation. By condemning
judicial elections across the board, we implicitly condemn countless elected state
judges and without warrant.”).
123. Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 797–803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 809–12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the announce clause
permitted a candidate to discuss general policy views, past judicial decisions,
and her concept of the role of a judge, and prevented the candidate only from
“publicly making known how [she] would decide disputed issues”) (quoting
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 881–82 (8th Cir. 2001))
(emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 812–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As Justice Ginsburg asserts, the
announce clause is necessary to prevent judicial candidates from circumventing
speech restrictions under the pledges and promises clause. Without the
announce clause, candidates could circumvent the pledges and promises clause
by making statements that clearly bind them to legal positions by adding, “I
cannot promise anything.” Preventing the pledges and promises clause from
becoming an overly formalistic restriction, the announce clause is indispensable
to Minnesota’s system for “balanc[ing] the constitutional interests in judicial
integrity and free expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary.”
Id.
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Reactions to White

After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,128 one open question is
whether other judicial candidate speech restrictions pass constitutional
muster. In the years since White, most courts have held recusal clauses to
be narrowly tailored and therefore constitutional.129 The pledges and
promises clause and commit clause,130 however, stand on shakier
ground. Several federal district courts have reasoned that these clauses
function as announce clauses and, thus, likewise violate the First
Amendment.131 The two state courts and single federal district court
upholding judicial candidate speech restrictions have done so by
construing them narrowly enough to permit a wide spectrum of political
speech.132 Circuit courts, for the most part, have avoided reaching the
128. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
129. See Fla. Family Policy Council v. Freeman, No. 4:06cv395-RH/WCS (N.D.
Fla. Sept. 11, 2007); Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879, 886–87
(N.D. Ind. 2006); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1234–35 (D.
Kan. 2006); Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp.
2d 1080, 1083–84 (D. Alaska 2005); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F.
Supp. 2d 1021, 1043–44 (D.N.D. 2005); Family Trust Found., Inc. v. Wolnitzek,
345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 705–11 (E.D. Ky. 2004). But see Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 970, 977 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (holding that, like the announce clause, a
clause requiring recusal where the judge “has made a public statement that
commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to . . . an issue in the
proceeding [or] the controversy in the proceeding” unconstitutionally chills
judicial candidates’ speech).
130. Patterned after the 1990 version of the American Bar Association Model
Code of Judicial Conduct and almost identical to Alaska’s clauses, these clauses
prohibit judicial candidates from “mak[ing] pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office” and from “mak[ing] statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court.” See, e.g., Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
131. Id. at 1039, 1044–45; Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 697, 711 (issuing a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the clauses); see also Shepard, 463 F.
Supp. 2d at 879, rev’d, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007); Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d at
1080, vacated, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007).
132. Pa. Family Inst. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351, 372–88 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(relying on an affidavit by the Chief Counsel of the Judicial Conduct Board and
interpreting the Pennsylvania Code to permit “[a]ny speech by a judicial
candidate short of a pledge, promise, or commitment to adjudicate a particular
result”); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003) (holding that Florida’s pledges
and promises and commit clauses barred judicial candidates only from
“promising to act in a partisan manner by favoring a discrete group or class of
citizens,” not from stating their personal views on disputed issues); In re
Watson, 100 N.Y. 2d 290, 301 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that, rather than prohibiting
all pledges and promises except those promising impartial performance of duty,
New York’s pledges and promises clause allowed judicial candidates to “promise
future conduct provided such conduct is not inconsistent with the faithful and
impartial performance of judicial duties”).
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merits of these claims; some have dismissed the cases on standing or
ripeness grounds,133 while others, recognizing an important state
interest in regulating its judiciary, have invoked abstention doctrines.134
The American Bar Association (ABA) also worried that the pledges
and promises clause and commit clause were vulnerable to a First
Amendment challenge.135 Those concerns led the ABA to make two
interesting, substantive revisions in its newest Model Code.136 First, the
Model Code answers White’s concerns that the relevant restrictions were
underinclusive137 by applying the relevant restrictions to both judges
and judicial candidates.138 Second, it collapses the pledges and promises
clause and commit clause into one narrow restriction prohibiting only
promises inconsistent with judicial impartiality.139 The previous
approach, which prohibited all promises other than that of judicial

133. Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the organization had failed to establish the presence of a willing
speaker, as required to meet standing requirements); Alaska Right to Life
Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that plaintiffs had not shown a real threat that the clauses would be enforced);
Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 169 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the
organization had failed to establish the presence of a willing speaker, as required
to have standing in a “right to listen” First Amendment case, and failed to
establish a real threat of enforcement, as required for the case to be ripe).
134. Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1118–22 (10th Cir. 2008)
(citing the rationale behind the Pullman abstention doctrine—that state law
underlying the plaintiff’s claims was unclear and resolving those issues could
obviate or alter the constitutional issues at stake—and certifying five questions
related to the meaning of certain canons in the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Kansas Supreme Court); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial
Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2003) (invoking Younger abstention and
holding it appropriate to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where disciplinary
proceedings against the judge had already commenced).
135. Matthew J. Medina, The Constitutionality of the 2003 Revisions to Canon
3(E) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1081–82 n.42
(2004) (quoting the Working Group on the First Amendment and Judicial
Campaigns, which revised the restrictions, as concluding that both the pledges
and promises and commit clauses, like the announce clause, are content-based
speech restrictions and would be subject to strict scrutiny analysis); see also Nat
Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 38 SETON
HALL L. REV. 63 (2008).
136. Mark Harrison, Chair Message on 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics (last accessed Nov. 5, 2008).
137. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–81 (2002).
138. As the introduction to Canon 4 states, “[a] judge or candidate for judicial
office shall not engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with
the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary.” Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, American Bar Association (2007), available at http://www
.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
139. See id.
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impartiality, implicated a wider spectrum of judicial speech.140 While
commentary accompanying the restrictions borrows Justice Ginsburg’s
theme of judicial independence from political influence,141 the act of
narrowing the restrictions responds to White’s majority opinion by
anticipating the restrictions’ relationship to Justice Scalia’s three
meanings of impartiality. With “impartial performance” left openended, the restriction can take on any of the definitions of impartiality
White deems a compelling state interest. Further, the restriction,
prohibiting only that which contravenes impartial judicial performance,
could not be narrower.
C.

The Nationwide Effort to Politicize Judicial Elections

The Indiana law firm of Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom has been the
driving force behind the majority of cases challenging judicial speech
restrictions, and its focus is not only on Alaska but on the nation as a
whole. In addition to arguing White before the Supreme Court of the
United States, James Bopp, Jr.142 was involved in Alaska Right to Life
Political Action Committee v. Feldman,143 at least three other cases that

140. As Rule 4.1(A)(13) states, “judges and judicial candidates shall not . . . in
connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.” Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, American Bar Association (2007), available at http://
.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
This
mirrors
the
narrowing constructions some courts have given the restrictions. See, e.g., In re
Watson, 100 N.Y.2d 290, 310 (N.Y. 2003).
141. As Comment 1 to Rule 4.1 states, the role of a judge, who decides cases
on law and facts, is different from the role of a legislator or member of the
executive branch, who makes decisions in accordance with the views and
preferences of the electorate. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, American Bar
Association (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_
MCJC_approved.pdf. “[I]n furtherance of this interest, judges and judicial
candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, be free and appear to be free
from political influence and political pressure.” Id.
142. Among other professional affiliations, Mr. Bopp is General Counsel for
the National Right to Life Committee, Special Counsel for Focus on the Family,
and General Counsel for the James Madison Center for Free Speech. James
Madison Center for Free Speech, Firm Biography, http://www.jamesmadison
center.org/firmbio.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
143. 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007).
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went to the circuit court level,144 and at least six cases that ended at the
district court level.145
Bopp believes that judges’ opinions on controversial issues should
be publicized so voters can make informed decisions at the polls.
“Anybody who tells you it doesn’t matter what judge you get is a fool,”
Bopp said in an interview. “Judges have discretion,” he continued,
“[t]heir personal opinions matter and their views matter.”146 As Bopp
explains, judges should be free to express their views and then be
expected to enforce the law.147 Critics believe that, rather than fighting
for judicial candidates’ speech rights, Bopp is using the First
Amendment to attack judicial independence and make judges
“ideologically accountable.”148
In the wake of White, a number of partisan interest groups,
particularly single-issue organizations, have begun soliciting judges’
views on hot-button issues prior to their initial or retention elections
through judicial candidate questionnaires.149 The often politically
conservative150 non-profit organizations send judicial candidates

144. James Bopp served as counsel in Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d
1107 (10th Cir. 2008), Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir.
2007), and Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2007).
145. James Bopp served as counsel in both district court cases declaring
judicial candidate speech restrictions unconstitutional—North Dakota Family
Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005) and Family Trust
Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004)—as
well as the district court case upholding judicial candidate speech restrictions—
Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
He also served as counsel in a district court case declaring a recusal statute
unconstitutional, Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968 (W.D. Wis. 2007); a
district court case upholding a recusal statute, Florida Family Policy Council v.
Freeman, No. 4:06cv395-RH/WCS (N.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2007); and a district court
case dismissing a challenge to provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial
Conduct on ripeness grounds, Wolfson v. Brammer, No. CIV 06-2357-PHX-SMM,
2007 WL 2288024 (D. Ariz. August 8, 2007).
146. Terry Carter, The Big Bopper, ABA J., Nov. 2006, at 33, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/the_big_bopper/;
see
also
Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 736 (“Judges often have discretion in deciding the
content of legal rules and in applying them to specific cases . . . . The beliefs and
views of a judge inevitably influence how that discretion will be exercised.”).
147. Carter, supra note 146, at 33.
148. Id. at 34. Mark Harrison, Chair of the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct said, “I don’t think he’d admit this, but he
wants judges who are ideologically accountable, which is inimical to the
Constitution.” Id.
149. See Roy Schotland, Impacts of White, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 625, 629 (2006–07).
150. But see Rebecca Mae Salokar, After White: An Insider’s Thoughts on Judicial
Campaign Speech, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 149, 156–57 (2005) (discussing a questionnaire
sent to judicial candidates by SAVE Dade, a gay rights organization based in
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questionnaires asking their opinions on legal and political issues. While
giving candidates the option of declining to answer, many
questionnaires, like the one sent by the Alaska Right to Life Political
Action Committee, warn candidates that the organization will
encourage its members to vote against the election or retention of those
who decline. Through these questionnaires, interest groups pressure
judicial candidates to make public their views on disputed legal issues;
candidates who decline to answer face the groups’ opposition as well as
criticism that declining to answer is “cowardly.”151
Further, the option to decline is paired with a pre-drafted reason
for declining. This allows the organization to allege in a subsequent
lawsuit that judicial candidates declined to answer for fear of being
disciplined or forced to recuse themselves. In lawsuits brought
nationwide to challenge judicial candidates’ speech restrictions, nonprofit organizations—rather than the judges whose speech is being
restricted—are often the plaintiffs.152

IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALASKA’S RESTRICTIONS ON
JUDICIAL CANDIDATE SPEECH AFTER WHITE
While plaintiffs have been frustrated by circuit courts dismissing
their cases on justiciability grounds, future cases, particularly those in
which judicial candidates join as plaintiffs and request official advisory
opinions, may survive justiciability inquiries.153 And although Alaska

southern Florida, soliciting judicial candidates’ opinions on issues relating to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
151. See Brennan Center Brief, supra note 33, at 18 (“Unlike federal court
nominees seeking confirmation, state judicial candidates often cannot afford the
luxury of refusing to answer the questionnaires.”) As a footnote argues, “[F]acial
invalidation of the Pledges Clause would almost invariably result in pressure for
promises inconsistent with litigants’ rights to due process.” Id. at n.8.
152. See Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2008); Ind. Right
to Life v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007); Alaska Right to Life Political
Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007); Pa. Family Institute v.
Black, 489 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2007); Wolfson v. Brammer, No. CIV 06-2357-PHXSMM, 2007 WL 2288024 (D. Ariz. Aug. 8, 2007) (including as plaintiff Alliance
Defense Fund Legal Center); Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968 (W.D. Wis.
2007) (including as plaintiff Wisconsin Right to Life); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc.
v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005); Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v.
Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004). But see Spargo v. N.Y. State
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (state judge and two of
his political supporters initiated lawsuit); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th
Cir. 2002) (judicial candidate and registered voter initiated lawsuit).
153. See, e.g., Bauer v. Shepard, No. 3:08-CV-196-TLS, 2008 WL 1994868 (N.D.
Ind. May 6, 2008) (including as plaintiffs Indiana Right to Life and two judicial
candidates to address standing problems of previous lawsuit).
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Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman was dismissed,
provisions of the Alaska’s judicial candidate speech restrictions may be
challenged again. Alaska Right to Life sent a second questionnaire to
Alaska judges before the 2008 retention election154 and plans to get
involved in Alaska’s 2010 judicial retention elections as well.155
A. Ripeness and Standing Hurdles
Any challenge to Alaska’s judicial candidate speech restrictions will
have to overcome justiciability obstacles. First, the ripeness issue156 will
not disappear. Under Commission rules, only the Commission may
issue a formal advisory opinion—a process involving research, collective
analysis and deliberation, drafting, and revision that may take months
to complete.157 Though a judge once requested an official advisory
opinion from the Commission, the Commission has never issued a
formal advisory opinion about the propriety of judges answering
AKRTL’s questionnaires and currently does not have plans to do so.158
As long as the Commission does not issue such an opinion, Greenstein
says she will continue to provide judges with informal guidance.159 “If
we can provide judges with the guidance they’re seeking and avoid
litigation, we think that’s the more prudent course,” she said.160
Greenstein does not expect any judges to quarrel with that decision; she
knows from conversations with judges around Alaska that the vast
majority of judges simply do not want to fill out questionnaires like

154. See Alaska Right to Life Committee Judicial Candidate Questionnaire
[hereinafter Alaska Right to Life 2008 Judicial Questionnaire] (mailed to Alaska
judges Sept. 2008) (on file with author).
155. Interview with Karen Lewis, supra note 68.
156. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee
v. Feldman on ripeness grounds because it held that plaintiffs had not shown a
threat of investigation by the Committee and of disciplinary action by the Alaska
Supreme Court. As the Ninth Circuit held, Greenstein’s letter to AKRTL and
Alaska judges was not a Commission-issued formal advisory opinion. See supra
Part II.C.
157. Comment from Jeffrey Feldman, supra note 76; see also Alaska Court
System – 2007–2008 Alaska Judicial Conduct Commission Rules, CommissionIssued Advisory Opinions, http://www.state.ak.us/courts/jcc.htm#19 (last
visited Nov. 10, 2008).
158. Interview with Marla Greenstein, supra note 74. Under the Commission’s
rules, the Commission chair determines which matters will be placed on the
agenda for full Commission consideration. Alaska Judicial Conduct Commission
Rules, Rule 1(c)(1); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the
decision to handle judges’ inquiries about AKRTL’s 2002 questionnaire
informally).
159. Interview with Marla Greenstein, supra note 74.
160. Id.
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AKRTL’s.161 Without a formal opinion that answering such a
questionnaire violates the Alaska Code or evidence that the Commission
and Alaska Supreme Court would consider disciplinary action against a
judge, a future challenge is unlikely to clear the ripeness hurdle.
Any future plaintiff will also have to meet standing requirements,
although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue. In First
Amendment law, a willing listener has standing to challenge speech
restrictions—but only where a willing speaker is also present.162 In other
words, if AKRTL wants to hear judges’ views on controversial legal
issues, it has standing to bring a lawsuit if: (1) one or more judges are
willing to speak on those issues, and (2) would speak but for a speech
restriction such as the Alaska Code. If the vast majority of judges are not
interested in responding to these partisan questionnaires, it will be hard
to show that any judge would do so but for the Code’s pledges and
promises clause or commit clause.163 To address some standing
problems,164 AKRTL’s 2008 questionnaire provided judges with five
possible responses: “Agree,” “Disagree,” “Undecided,” “Decline to
Answer,” and “Refuse to Answer.”165 The predrafted reasoning for the
“Decline to Answer” option was also specifically tied to the pledges and
promises clause and commit clause.166 According to AKRTL, none of the
judges who received its 2008 questionnaire responded by checking any
of the responses provided.167
Nonetheless, despite these justiciability hurdles, even one judge
interested in challenging Alaska’s judicial speech restrictions would

161. Id.
162. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976) (holding that where a willing speaker has a right to
speak, listeners have a “reciprocal right to receive” that speech); see also Pa.
Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2007) (dismissing case
where plaintiff challenging speech restrictions did not establish the presence of a
willing speaker).
163. The “decline” option on AKRTL’s questionnaire was tied to predrafted
reasoning—that answering is prohibited or would require the judges’ later
recusal—intended to meet this “but for” requirement. First, this did not tie the
judges’ demurral to one specific clause but to all restrictions generally. Second, it
may be unpersuasive because the judges themselves did not draft it. See Black,
489 F.3d at 168–69 (holding that predrafted content of footnote in plaintiffs’
questionnaire did not necessarily reflect views of judicial candidates).
164. See id. (articulating difficulties demonstrating plaintiff’s standing in a
similar case).
165. See Alaska Right to Life 2008 Judicial Questionnaire, supra note 154.
166. See id. (“By checking this option, I hereby attest that I would have replied
to this question but for the prospect that I may be disciplined for doing so under
Alaska Judicial Canon 5A(3)(d) . . .”). The recusal clause, which all but one court
has found constitutional, see supra Part III.B, was not mentioned. See id.
167. Interview with Karen Lewis, supra note 68.
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have the power to meet justiciability requirements. If AKRTL locates just
one judge eager to speak but afraid to violate the Alaska Code, the
standing requirement would be met. Further, one judge, upon receiving
AKRTL’s questionnaire, could issue a written request for a formal
advisory opinion from the Commission. If the Commission issued a
formal opinion forbidding him to respond to the questionnaire or chose
not to issue a formal opinion at all,168 the judge could file a lawsuit
requesting review of the restrictions. He could also opt to answer the
questionnaire and file a lawsuit only if sanctioned. Under both
scenarios, the judge would likely meet the ripeness requirement.
B.

Judicial Candidate Speech Restrictions in a Merit-Based System
of Judicial Selection

If AKRTL is able to reach the merits in a future lawsuit, it would
still face distinctions between the facts of White and the situation in
Alaska. The most interesting of these distinctions is judicial selection:
while judges in Minnesota are elected, Alaska uses the merit system.
The nature of the judicial election—and possibly the role of voters
in the election—may be different in a merit system. In White, Minnesota
voters were being asked to elect judges from among true judicial
candidates. In Alaska, they are given the Council’s evaluation of the
judges’ performance along several nonpartisan criteria and the Council’s
nonpartisan recommendation for retention or non-retention. A voter can
certainly vote to retain or not retain a judge for any reason, including
disagreement over that judge’s decisions, but a retention election is
structured around the hope that voters will weigh a judge’s past judicial
performance and determine whether he is competent and qualified to
remain in office.169 Along these lines, some commentators argue that
voters in a retention election are entitled to different information than
voters in a contested judicial election.170

168. In White, for example, one of the petitioners, a judicial candidate, sought
an advisory opinion from the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility
Board, but the Lawyers Board declined to provide one. Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 769 (2002).
169. Cady & Phelps, supra note 12, at 372. While selection commissions
evaluate what a judicial candidate would bring to the bench, voters in a
retention election also have the benefit of knowing how a judge has performed
once placed in the role. Id.
170. See, e.g., id. at 368. As two commentators, a state court justice and a law
clerk, wrote:
[T]he adoption of merit selection is a giant step towards eliminating
any need for a retention voter to know the personal views of a judge
and, in turn, the need for a judge to exercise the right to express
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In addition, a merit system of judicial selection may change the
posture of the judge-as-potential-speaker. In Minnesota, he is a true
candidate for judicial office; in Alaska, he is already draped in the robes
of judicial office.171 Insofar as partisan speech by a judge, whom society
trusts to be impartial, is more unseemly than partisan speech by a
candidate who is not yet a judge, this distinction is important.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in White does not seem to leave
much room for nuanced differentiation between judicial and legislative
elections,172 much less between different kinds of judicial elections.
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, however, specifically links the outcome
in the case to Minnesota’s adoption of a pure election system.173 Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence also creates space to distinguish between
election and merit-based systems of judicial selection by emphasizing
that White does not decide the constitutionality of restricting sitting
judges’ speech through judicial conduct codes.174 Although the Alaska

personal views on political and legal issues. Information relevant to a
retention election relates to professional competency and performance
on the bench.
Id. Other commentators take the opposite position. As Erwin Chemerinsky, law
school dean and constitutional law professor, wrote:
A judicial candidate’s ideology is an appropriate consideration in any
judicial selection process for the obvious reason that it reflects how the
person will likely decide cases. This is not to lessen the importance of
professional qualifications and judicial temperament; they obviously
are always considerations. But they alone are not sufficient for
evaluating judicial candidates.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 738.
171. During oral argument in the Ninth Circuit for Alaska Right to Life Political
Action Committee v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007), one judge on the panel
emphasized this distinction. In Alaska, those receiving questionnaires are “being
asked to speak as judges. It’s very different from candidates” (emphasis added)
(oral arguments on file with journal).
172. White, 536 U.S. at 783–84. While leaving open the possibility that the First
Amendment could allow more regulation of campaigns for judicial than
legislative office, Justice Scalia argues that, because “state-court judges possess
the power to ‘make’ common law [and] . . . to shape the States’ constitutions,”
judges are not completely separate from the “enterprise of ‘representative
government.’” Id.
173. Id. at 789–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Minnesota has chosen to select
its judges through contested popular elections instead of through an
appointment system or a combined appointment and retention election system
along the lines of the Missouri Plan.”); see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
174. White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This case does not
present the question whether a State may restrict the speech of judges because
they are judges—for example, as part of a code of judicial conduct; the law at
issue here regulates judges only when and because they are candidates.”).
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Code explicitly restricts the speech of any “candidate for judicial
office,”175 retention elections by nature involve sitting judges.
Alaska’s judicial speech restrictions may survive strict scrutiny if
courts choose to read these concurrences carefully. Courts could, for
example, differentiate between judicial candidate speech restrictions in
pure election systems and in merit-based systems. They might also
distinguish between restricting the speech of new candidates for judicial
office and restricting the speech of sitting judges standing for retention.
Along those lines, and further distinguishing its judicial speech
restrictions from of Minnesota, Alaska could revise its Code to restrict
only the speech of sitting judges.
C.

Constitutionality of Alaska’s “Pledges and Promises Clause” and
“Commit Clause”

If a challenge to the pledges and promises clause and commit
clause survives ripeness and standing inquiries and courts do not
differentiate between speech restrictions in election and merit-based
judicial selection systems, the clauses would likely be held
unconstitutional. Although Alaska’s pledges and promises clause and
commit clause are different from the announce clause at issue in White,
the broad reasoning in White’s majority opinion probably renders this
distinction inconsequential.176
Government speech restrictions must meet strict scrutiny when
they are content-based restrictions.177 Alaska’s pledges and promises
clause and commit clause are content-based speech restrictions because
they regulate the topics upon which judicial candidates are permitted to
speak.178 Thus, to be constitutional, the clauses must meet strict scrutiny

175. Under the Alaska Code, a person becomes a judicial candidate when he
“makes a public announcement of candidacy [or] declares or files as a candidate
with the election or appointment authority . . .” Alaska Code of Judicial
Conduct, Terminology, “Candidate.” This applies to individuals seeking judicial
nomination and judges seeking retention. Id. at “Candidate for judicial office.”
176. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 135, at 81–95, 98–107 (considering the majority
opinion’s denial that judicial elections are different from other political elections,
its application of strict scrutiny, and its discussion of a judicial role in
lawmaking).
177. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992); see also Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982) (holding that, unless the regulation meets
strict scrutiny, the government may not prohibit candidates for elected office
from making campaign promises to conduct that office in a way beneficial to
certain voter groups).
178. See, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 197 (“This Court has held that the First
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a
restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public
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by being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.179 Under
the majority’s approach in White, judicial impartiality may be a
compelling state interest where it refers to a lack of bias for or against a
party to a proceeding but is not a compelling state interest where it
refers to a lack of bias for or against a particular legal view.180 It is
unclear whether judicial impartiality in the sense of open-mindedness
could be a compelling state interest.181 The majority opinion addressed
only state interests in impartiality and the appearance of impartiality;182
thus it is plausible that other state interests in judicial candidate speech
restrictions could be compelling.
Alaska’s commit clause183 does not address bias with respect to
parties to a proceeding and therefore does not serve the compelling state
interest in White. If the commit clause was intended to serve a state
interest in judicial open-mindedness, it is under-inclusive because like
the announce clause, it only restricts speech by judicial candidates and
not sitting judges.184 More likely, Alaska’s commit clause, which
explicitly targets statements committing candidates to “a particular view
or decision,” is also intended to ensure judicial impartiality in terms of a

discussion of an entire topic.”). To be content-neutral, a speech restriction must
be both viewpoint neutral, meaning it regulates speech irrespective of the
ideology expressed, and subject-matter neutral, meaning it regulates speech
irrespective of the topic of speech. Id.
179. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 774–75.
180. Id. at 775–78.
181. Id. at 778–80.
182. Id. at 775. Though the Eighth Circuit also referred to a state interest in an
“independent” judiciary in its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the Eighth
Circuit treated the state interest in an “independent” judiciary and in an
“impartial” judiciary as one in the same. Id. at 775 n.6. It is unclear, then,
whether a state’s interest in judicial independence could be treated as a separate
state interest in the future.
183. The commit clause prohibits judicial candidates from “mak[ing]
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate to a particular view or
decision with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court.” Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006)
(emphasis added).
184. The Supreme Court was skeptical that Minnesota sought to promote
judicial open-mindedness via its announce clause. As the Court pointed out,
“statements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal portion of the public
commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-be)” often express their
legal views in books, speeches, and through teaching—activities unrestricted,
and in some cases encouraged, by the Minnesota Code. White, 536 U.S. at 779–80.
This argument suggests that courts could be similarly skeptical of the commit
clause as a vehicle for promoting judicial open-mindedness and offers another
reason why the commit clause could be found under-inclusive.
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lack of bias for or against a particular legal view—a state interest that the
White court held was not compelling.185
Whether commit clauses have narrower restrictions186 than
announce clauses or whether they “are one and the same” is an open
question.187 Nonetheless, commit clauses are vulnerable for several
reasons. First, by restricting speech “with respect to cases, controversies
or issues that are likely to come before the court,”188 a commit clause can
restrict judicial speech on almost any issue. According to the White
majority, limiting speech restrictions to issues likely to come before a
court “is not much of a limitation at all.”189 Second, by prohibiting
statements that actually commit candidates to particular views and
decisions as well as statements that “appear to commit” candidates,190 a
commit clause may be interpreted as broadly as an announce clause. As
acknowledged in the Alaska Code Commentary, some listeners might
interpret a judicial candidate’s description of his legal philosophy as
committing him “to a particular view or decision.”191 If that is the case,
the commit clause may be too broad to meet strict scrutiny.192 If the
commit clause’s “appear to commit” language is not read broadly,
however, it is unclear what it would add to the pledges and promises
clause.193 Finally, as stated earlier, Alaska’s commit clause restricts only

185. Id. at 777–79.
186. In 1990, the ABA replaced the announce clause with the commit clause
because it deemed the announce clause “an overly broad restriction on speech”
and the commit clause was intended to be a narrower restriction. See Richard
Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 203 (2004).
187. White, 536 U.S. at 773 n.5.
188. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006).
189. White, 536 U.S. at 772 (Of disputes “that are the proper . . . business of
state courts, ‘[t]here is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come
before a judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction.’”)
(quoting Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)).
190. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006).
191. See Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d) and Commentary
to Canon 5A(3)(d) (2006).
192. See Briffault, supra note 186, at 217 (observing that the language “appear
to commit” may allow state commissions and supreme courts to use the clause
against judicial candidates making statements of judicial philosophy or political
belief).
193. See Briffault, supra note 186, at 216–19 (noting that the concept of
committing oneself to a course of action is very similar to the concept of
pledging a course of action and that the ABA folded the commit clause into the
pledges and promises clause in its amended Model Code).
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judicial candidates’ speech194 and is probably under-inclusive for that
reason.195
The pledges and promises clause196 seems more narrowly tailored
for preventing judicial candidates from committing themselves to future
judicial conduct than the commit clause. By requiring the use of
promissory language, the clause implies a candidate’s intent to bind
himself to specific conduct.197 While the difference between a judicial
candidate announcing his views on an issue and making a pledge to rule
a particular way may be small, promissory language challenges judicial
open-mindedness more than statements of one’s judicial perspective.198
The pledges and promises clause, however, prohibits all judicial
candidates’ pledges and promises “other than to faithfully and
impartially perform the duties of the office.”199 This is problematic
because many statements could be considered pledges of future
conduct. For example, if a judicial candidate makes a pledge to
streamline the administrative functions of the court,200 his statement is
prohibited by the text of the pledges and promises clause though it is
not a threat to judicial open-mindedness. A court is unlikely to consider
such a ban a narrow restriction on judicial candidate speech.201
Furthermore, both Alaska’s pledges and promises clause and commit

194. Although Alaska’s retention elections by nature involve sitting judges,
the Alaska Code restricts only the speech of “candidate[s] for judicial office.” See
infra Part IV.B.
195. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2002).
196. The pledges and promises clause prohibits judicial candidates from
“mak[ing] pledges or promises of conduct in judicial office other than to
faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the office.” Alaska Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2006).
197. In discussing a possible state interest in judicial open-mindedness,
Justice Scalia rejected Justice Stevens’ argument that judges could be more
reluctant to contradict, in a subsequent ruling, campaign statements than
statements made at other times. White, 536 U.S. at 780. He added, however, that
such a situation “might be plausible, perhaps, with regard to campaign promises”
and noted that the pledges and promises clause was not under consideration. Id.
198. See Briffault, supra note 186, at 213–14.
199. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2006) (emphasis
added).
200. While “how [he] would handle administrative duties if elected” was on a
list of pre-approved topics for judicial candidates in White, the Alaska Code
provides no such list. White, 536 U.S. at 774.
201. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 135, at 116–21; Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry
Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the pledges and promises
clause restricted potentially problematic judicial campaign speech “in the most
comprehensive way possible”).
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clause may be vulnerable to overbreadth202 and vagueness203
challenges.204
The Alaska Supreme Court, the final authority on the Alaska Code
of Judicial Conduct, could adopt narrow constructions of the pledges
and promises clause and commit clause as several other state courts
have done.205 Because the plain texts of the clauses do not support such a
narrow interpretation, however, redrafting the clauses and rendering
their language and meaning consistent may be a more appropriate
remedy.206

202. Overbroad laws are laws that legitimately regulate unprotected speech
but may have the effect of discouraging, or chilling, protected speech. See, e.g.,
Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 967–68 (1984). As the
Supreme Court has noted, “[P]ersons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal
sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected
expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (invalidating a law
prohibiting “opprobrious words or abusive language” for overbreadth where
state courts had not narrowly construed the law).
203. Like overbroad laws, vague laws—laws for which a reasonable person
cannot distinguish what activity is permissible from what activity is
prohibited—may also chill protected speech. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963) (invalidating a law prohibiting attorneys from soliciting clients).
Because of the danger that such laws could chill protected speech, “standards of
permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.” Id. at
432. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 740 (considering vagueness of Model
Code pledges and promises and commit clauses).
204. No individual is better positioned to know what the law permits or
prohibits than a judge. Several of the judges running for retention in 2002,
however, said they did not know whether Alaska’s Code of Judicial Conduct
permitted or prohibited responses to AKRTL’s questionnaire. In his response to
AKRTL’s questionnaire, Justice Carpeneti wrote that he was “not at all certain
that responding to your group’s questions is allowed under the Alaska code.”
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at Exhibit
E-1 to E-2. Judge Pengilly was also unsure of whether his speech was permitted,
saying, “[G]iven the uncertainty surrounding the situation, it appears that the
appropriate response to your questionnaire under present circumstances is to
decline to answer.” Id. at E-10. He added, “[I]t is far from clear that judges in
Alaska have [the] freedom” to discuss the issues raised in AKRTL’s
questionnaire. Id. While the judges may have been using the Alaska Code as an
excuse not to answer the questionnaire, their statements could also be
interpreted as genuine uncertainty.
205. See In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003); In re Watson, 794 N.E. 2d 1, 6
(N.Y. 2003) (construing New York’s pledges and promises clause as allowing all
pledges and promises except those inconsistent with the impartial performance
of duty).
206. The ABA’s 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct offers one possible
guide. See supra Part III.B.
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V. MAINTAINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN ALASKA
Invalidating Alaska’s judicial candidate speech restrictions would
strip judges of one excuse for not responding to questions like those
posed by AKRTL’s questionnaire. This would give new license to
partisan individuals and interest groups who want to question judges,
punish those who decline to answer with non-retention campaigns, and
could damage the strong nonpartisan culture and independence of
Alaska’s judiciary.
When lower courts interpreted White to invalidate announce clause
restrictions, some observers noted heightened politicization in judicial
campaigns.207 Increased politicization is apparent in states that select
judges through partisan judicial elections208 and, to a lesser extent, in
states that utilize nonpartisan elections.209 “[M]any candidates conclude
that they cannot afford to occupy the moral high ground in the heat of a
campaign,” explained the Brennan Center for Justice in an amicus
brief.210 Recognizing the effect that invalidating Alaska’s judicial speech
restrictions could have on the independence of Alaska’s judiciary, this
Part explores ways to combat future partisan attacks on judges in the
absence of those restrictions.

207. See, e.g., Brennan Center Brief, supra note 33. Even before White, both
ideological and business-related interest groups have been involved in judicial
elections for some time, and observers had noted their increasing influence. See
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1391, 1394–1407 (2001).
208. George W. Soule, The Threats of Partisanship to Minnesota’s Judicial
Elections, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 701, 716–21 (2008). In Illinois and Alabama,
both partisan election states, judicial candidates in recent elections spent millions
of dollars campaigning. Id. at 716–18. In Alabama, campaigns commonly
reference controversial issues; the incumbent chief justice, for example, told
voters that “[i]ssues relating to the right to life and the sanctity of marriage are
in the soul of Alabamians, and they want a judge who shares their conservative
views.” Id. at 717 (quoting Drew Jubera, There's Nothing Civil About Alabama
Judicial Race, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 5, 2006, at A2). In Texas, also a partisan
election state, the 2006 election saw Democratic judicial candidates defeat
Republican judicial candidates in twenty-eight contests. Id. at 718. Only five
Republican judges, all running unopposed, retained their seats. Id. “The voters
didn’t differentiate between the good and bad Democrats, nor the good and bad
Republicans, opting for a wholesale party swap without regard to each
candidate’s particular qualifications.” Id. (quoting Matt Pulle, Accidental Victors,
DALLAS OBSERVER, Nov. 16, 2006).
209. Soule, supra note 208, at 718–19. In Wisconsin, a nonpartisan election
state, two judicial candidates in a 2007 election were nonetheless identified with
the Democrat and Republican parties. Id. The race cost $6 million, and both
candidates were disappointed by the overwhelming presence of third parties
and the importance of campaign contributions. Id. at 719.
210. Brennan Center Brief, supra note 33, at 4.
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A. Culture of the Judiciary and Merit-Based Selection Revisited
To maintain the independence and integrity of its judiciary in the
face of partisan interest groups’ involvement in retention elections,
Alaska’s most powerful asset is the judicial culture developed by its
merit-based selection system. Simply stated, judges do not have to
respond to interest groups’ questionnaires or phone calls soliciting their
views on controversial issues. Judge Murphy’s response to AKRTL’s
questionnaire, declining to answer any questions because doing so
would contravene his personal Judge’s Code, is evidence that Alaska
judges may decline for reasons beyond fear of being disciplined.211 In
the wake of White, as one commentator has stated, “traditional norms
are bound to loosen,”212 and judicial candidates may feel increasingly
comfortable voicing their viewpoints on controversial legal and political
issues when they find it politically advantageous. Merit selection,
however, resists this tide by creating an institutional disincentive to
judicial engagement in partisan activities and a stronger culture of
nonpartisan judicial conduct. As one Alaska judge explained, partisan
behavior goes against the grain of the nonpartisan, non-adversarial
selection process in which Alaska judges have practiced and have been
selected.213 The vast majority of judges thus view partisan behavior with
a “sense of distaste.”214
In his White concurrence, Justice Kennedy discussed the importance
of creating a judicial culture that values and promotes impartiality:
“Explicit standards of judicial conduct,” Justice Kennedy asserted,
“provide essential guidance for judges in the proper discharge of their
duties and honorable conduct of their office.”215 They also encourage
judicial candidates and sitting judges to strive for integrity within their
profession.216 While not restricting judicial campaign speech, such
standards may nonetheless dissuade judicial candidates from
addressing certain issues in the interest of maintaining the integrity of

211. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
212. Schotland, supra note 149, at 629 (noting that, one day after the Supreme
Court denied review of the Eighth Circuit’s en banc decision narrowing
prohibitions against candidates’ personally soliciting campaign funds, a judicial
candidate in Arkansas sent emails soliciting funding).
213. A superior court judge shared this sentiment with the author of this
Note; to preserve his anonymity, he will remain unnamed.
214. Id.
215. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 763, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
216. Id.
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the state judicial system. Other commentators have emphasized the role
of public education in maintaining a nonpartisan judicial culture.217
To further institutionalize Alaska’s nonpartisan judicial tradition,
Alaska bar members could also establish an independent organization to
assist judges in neutralizing partisan attacks against them. This
organization could maintain funds to finance the last-minute countercampaigns of judges recommended for retention but nonetheless
targeted by partisan attacks. It could also assist judges in planning their
counter-campaigns.218
Finally, if partisan groups choose to contact sitting judges, judicial
nominees, or judicial applicants to discern their views on legal and
political issues, those organizations should be required to notify the
Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct and the Alaska Judicial Council
of their communication with those individuals. If an organization
decides to send judges a questionnaire, for example, it would have to
send a copy of that questionnaire to the Commission and the Council.
Most importantly, this would increase the transparency of partisan
groups’ interactions with judges. The Commission or the Council could
then make a decision about whether to post the questionnaire on a
public forum as a way of educating the public about partisan pressures
the judges are facing or to simply notify all Alaska judges about the
contact so they may be prepared in the event they are likewise
contacted.
B.

Recusal and Judicial Disqualification as Remedies

In his White concurrence, Justice Kennedy offered strict recusal
clauses as an alternative to judicial speech restrictions for ensuring
judicial impartiality. Minnesota, he said, “may adopt recusal standards
more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who
violate these standards.”219 Commentators also look to recusal clauses as

217. See Jessica Gall, Living With Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: The
Birth and Death of Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 97,
123–26 (2008); Cady & Phelps, supra note 12, at 369–80.
218. An organization could provide, as models, the print ads published by
supporters of Justices Rabinowitz and Fabe and Judge Tan emphasizing the
jurists’ nonpartisan professional qualifications for the bench. Given the relatively
narrow reach of newspapers when compared with television and the Internet, it
could also consider those methods of communication tastefully and effectively
to support the judge’s retention campaign.
219. White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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constitutional means of safeguarding the impartiality of state
judiciaries.220
Alaska’s recusal clause, which requires that judges recuse
themselves where their “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,”221 likely meets strict scrutiny. It serves a clearly compelling
state interest in providing impartial judges so litigants receive due
process222 and is narrowly tailored to achieve this compelling interest.223
As a district court in Florida noted in the course of upholding a recusal
clause broader than that in the Alaska Code,224 such a clause
prohibits speech not at all, and burdens speech only a trifle,
allowing a judge to keep the same job at the same pay and to
perform the same type of work with the same perquisites while
giving up only the right to preside over cases (presumably few
if any) in which the judge reasonably appears not to have an
open mind.225
Though designed to prevent judges from sitting on cases where
their lack of impartiality or appearance of lack of impartiality threatens
litigants due process,226 critics have suggested that using recusal clauses
to fill the void left by vanishing judicial candidate speech restrictions is a
solution that “suffers from a deep manageability problem.”227 States,
220. See Gall, supra note 217, at 123; see also Carrington, supra note 42, at 115
(suggesting that a judge should be disqualified from sitting on cases where a
large contributor to his campaign is a party or has a significant financial
interest).
221. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1) (2006). The recusal clause
also identifies appropriate grounds for recusal, including personal bias
concerning a party or party’s lawyer as one ground for disqualification. Personal
bias concerning an issue is not identified as a ground for disqualification. See
Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1)(a) (2006).
222. See N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1043 (D.
N.D. 2005). Both “[t]he public and individual litigants must be reassured that the
judiciary will decide legal disputes based on the law alone rather than on any
inherent bias or prejudice of the presiding judge.” Id. (citing Family Trust
Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004)).
223. See Fla. Family Policy Council v. Freeman, No. 4:06cv395-RH/WCS (N.D.
Fla. Sept. 11, 2007) (upholding clause requiring recusal where a judge “made a
public statement that commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to . .
. an issue in the proceeding [or] a controversy in the proceeding”).
224. Upholding a very similar recusal clause, a district court in Kentucky
noted that “due process concerns do not necessarily require recusal in every case
in which a judge has expressed an opinion,” so “recusal is not required in every
instance in which a judge has expressed a view – publicly or not – on a certain
issue.” Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
225. Freeman, No. 4:06cv395-RH/WCS at *8.
226. Gall, supra note 217, at 121.
227. Developments in the Law – Voting and Democracy, Judicial Elections and
Free Speech, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1142 (2006).
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they assert, will have difficulty identifying the point at which a judge’s
speech or conduct, whether during his campaign or while on the bench,
indicates he may not be impartial.228 Further, a recusal remedy
ultimately relies upon judges’ awareness of their own potential biases
and willingness to recuse themselves or upon parties’ awareness of
judges’ biases and willingness to move for recusal.229
This criticism overlooks a second benefit of recusal clauses in the
context of judicial speech: strict recusal clauses also protect judicial
candidates’ right not to speak about controversial legal and political
issues by providing a judicially responsible—and politically excusable—
reason to decline response.230 If judges are not clamoring to respond to
partisan interest groups’ questionnaires or other means of soliciting their
views, the recusal clause may be a very effective remedy.
Another remedy, which few commentators have considered, is
peremptory disqualification. Peremptory disqualification may help
ensure judicial impartiality while avoiding some of the disadvantages
that recusal presents. Unlike disqualification for cause, which suggests a
judge may not ethically sit on a case because his or her bias in that
matter may be inferred,231 peremptory disqualification, allows a party to
reject a judge for any reason or no reason at all.232
Under Alaska Criminal Rule 25(d) and Alaska Civil Rule 42(c), one
peremptory challenge per litigant is a matter of right—at least at the trial
court level.233 Parties must file a “Notice of Change of Judge,” but they

228. Id.
229. See Mary Eileen Weicher, The Expansion of the First Amendment in Judicial
Elections: Another Cause for Reform, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 833, 888 (2007).
230. Roy Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J.
1077, 1102 (2007). In response to solicitations for their views on these issues,
judicial candidates may say, “I know what you would like me to say, but if I go
into that then I will be unable to sit in just the cases you care about most.” Id. In
contested elections, they may also turn the tables on opponents who have
already answered the questions for political gain: “My opponent has told you
what he thinks you want [to hear], but has not told you that he will not be able
to deliver because he will be disqualified from the cases you care about.” Id.
231. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020 (2006); Marla N. Greenstein, Judicial
Disqualification in Alaska Courts, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 53, 61–70 (2000). A judge is
required to recuse himself from sitting on cases where, for example, he is a party
or has a strong financial interest in the outcome. See ALASKA STAT. §
22.20.020(a)(4) (2006). Disqualification for cause is not a discretionary matter,
and the presiding judge may order disqualification if a judge asked to disqualify
himself does not. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(c) (2006).
232. Alaska is one of seventeen states allowing peremptory challenges to
judges. Schotland, supra note 230, at 1102; see also Greenstein, supra note 226, at
61–70.
233. ALASKA CRIM. R. 25(d)(1) (“In any criminal case in superior or district
court, the prosecution and defense shall each be entitled as a matter of right to
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need not submit an affidavit or specify their reasons for exercising the
peremptory challenge.234 In Alaska, peremptory disqualification of a
trial court judge is thus easy to obtain. A party may opt to exercise a
peremptory challenge against a trial court judge for any reason, rational
or irrational, including the belief that the judge may be unfair or partial.
This safety net ensures that litigants receive due process because
litigants can disqualify trial court judges who may be biased.235
Moreover, it preserves the unbiased appearance of the judiciary—even if
a trial court judge is not biased, he may be disqualified simply because
the litigants appearing before him believe he is biased.
Knowing this, judicial candidates for trial courts may be less likely
to engage in partisan speech that could prompt litigants to question
their impartiality. Where a trial court judge does make partisan
statements on a controversial issue, litigants appearing before him in a
matter related to that issue are empowered by Alaska’s peremptory
challenge rules to have a different judge hear their case. Importantly,
like the recusal clause, peremptory disqualification also gives judicial
candidates, at least at the trial court level, a reason for declining to
disclose their opinions on disputed legal issues: in responding, they risk
prompting future litigants to use peremptory challenges to disqualify
them in cases involving those very issues.

CONCLUSION
In a talk at Fordham Law School given after she stepped down
from the Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor emphasized that judicial
election, a tradition particular to the United States, requires sacrificing

one change of judge.”); ALASKA CIV. R. 42(c)(1) (“In an action pending in the
Superior or District courts, each side shall be entitled as a matter of right to a
change of one judge and one master.”).
234. ALASKA CRIM. R. 25(d)(2); ALASKA CIV. R. 42(c)(1). Litigants may only
disqualify a judge by filing an affidavit “alleging under oath the belief that a fair
and impartial trial cannot be obtained.” ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022(a) (2006). As
the Alaska Supreme Court held, however, Alaska Criminal Rule 25(d) was
intended to jettison the statutory affidavit requirement and, thus, the procedures
outlined in Rule 25(d) supersede any inconsistent requirements in section
22.20.022 of the Alaska Statutes. Gieffels v. State, 552 P.2d 661, 667–68 (Alaska
1976). Extending this principle to civil proceedings, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that Alaska Civil Rule 42(c) procedures similarly supersede inconsistent
statutory requirements, including the affidavit requirement. Tunley v.
Municipality of Anchorage School Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 70–71 (Alaska 1981).
235. Of course each party receives only one peremptory challenge. Thus, if a
party exercises one peremptory challenge and is assigned a new judge, he may
not exercise a second peremptory challenge even if he believes the new judge
will be biased against him.
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judicial impartiality: “No other nation in the world [elects its judges],”
she said, “because they realize you’re not going to get fair and impartial
judges that way.”236 Delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention
came to the same conclusion fifty years ago and adopted a merit-based
judicial selection system to guarantee fair and impartial judges.237
Rather than encouraging selection of judges based on neutral
criteria, partisan groups like Alaska Right to Life aim to make retention
elections political. The danger in their judicial questionnaires is in
suggesting to the public, and possibly to judges themselves, that a
judge’s responsibility is not to be as fair and impartial as possible but,
instead, to be responsive to voters’ views on a handful of controversial
issues. Judges hearing challenges to state codes of judicial conduct,
particularly those brought by such groups, should consider reading
White narrowly before striking down provisions intended to preserve a
culture of judicial impartiality. In the meantime, Alaska judges should
refrain from answering questions that risk making them the pawns of
partisan interest groups,238 and Alaska bar members should help
qualified and competent judges prepare counter-campaigns in advance
of partisan attacks.

236. Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2008, at A1.
237. Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes Concerning Judicial Selection
and Retention, 586–87, 611, available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/General/
akccon.htm (Judiciary Committee Chairman George McLaughlin declared that,
if the merit-based system proposed were adopted, it would be “the most
modern, most liberal, most workable judiciary article of all the constitutions of
all the forty-nine states”).
238. Ind. Right to Life v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Viewed
somewhat skeptically, the situation is a chess game. Candidates may not want
to answer the questions and would perhaps be happy to have the Code as a
reason to decline. When that is true, Right to Life, while ostensibly asserting the
right of candidates to speak, may, in fact, be acting against what the candidates
see as their best interests. And probably much to Right to Life’s dismay, the
Commission, by taking no action against candidates, is simply not playing. The
voters? One can hope that they can discern when a candidate is ducking a
legitimate question and when she is legitimately refusing to become a pawn.”).

